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L Introduction
This brief commentary argues two points. First, that unilateral uses of national
military force, like the December 16-19, 1998, air and cruise missile strikes carried
out against Iraq by British and U.S.personnell to compel adherence to that
country&apos;s U.N. commitments regarding weapons of mass destruction (WMD),2
are not clearly permissible under the language and circumstances surrounding the
adoption of Security Council resolution 687.3 And second, that among the options
being explored4 to both resolve the current impasse regarding WMD inspections
in Iraq,5 and assure that the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) does not
continue to be plagued by the halting progress which has marked its eight year
existence, there is at least one viable option that has not been the subject of any
noticeable amount of public discussion.
* Professor of Law and Director, Comparative and International Law Center, University of Tulsa.
This essay is associated with the following works: Rex J. Zedalis, An Analysis of Some of the
Principal Legal Questions Relating to U.N. Weapons Inspections in Iraq, 67 Nordic J. Int&apos;l L. 249
(1998); Rex J. Z e d a 11 s, Untying the Gordian Knot: Evaluating the Legal Dimensions of the U.N.
Weapons Inspection Program in Iraq and Rethinking the Future (publication forthcoming).
I See Francis X. C 11 n e s and Steven Lee M y e r s, Biggest Attack Since &apos;91 War - Britain Gives
Support, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1998, at Al, col. 5. See also Philip Shenon, Strike Aims to Cripple
Weapons Centers, N.Y. Times, ibid., at A15, col. 3. Strike concluded after four days of bombing, see
Steven Lee M y e r s, U.S. and Britain End Raids on Iraq, Calling Mission a Success, N.Y. Times, Dec.
20, 1998, available athttp://wwwnytimes.com/library/world/mideast/122098iraq-rpd.htmI (accessed
Dec. 23, 1998).
2 On Iraqs acceptance of the obligations under resolution 687, see Letter from the Foreign
Minister of the Republic of Iraq to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council
(Apr. 6, 1991), U.N. Doc. S/22456. On the details of the obligations of resolution 687, see Plan for
the Implementation of Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991): Report
of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/22614,17 May 1991; Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and
Verification of Iraqs Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution
687 (1991): Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/22871/Rev.1, 2 Oct. 1991; Plan for Future
Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraqs Compliance with Paragraph 12 of Part C of Security
Council Resolution 687 (1991) and with the Requirements of Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Resolution 707
(1991), U.N. Doc. S/22872/Rev.1, 20 Sept. 1991.
3 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991), adopted Apr. 3, 1991, reprinted in: 30 Int&apos;l Legal Mat. 847
(1991). No attempt is made herein to determine the validity of other bases that may be advanced to
justify the use of force against Iraq.
4 See Barbara C r o s s e t t e, France, In Break With U.S., Urges End to Iraq Embargo, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1999, at A6, col. 3; Jane P e r I e z, U.S. Proposes Easing U.N. Curbs on Iraq Oil, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 15, 1999, at A8, col. 1.
5 At the time of the writing of this comment, all weapons inspection activities in Iraq had been
halted, and there was concern over the fact that the joint U.S.-British bombing campaign of Decem-
ber 16-19 might end the possibility of future Iraqi cooperation on the inspection front. The current
impasse began with Iraq blocking all but passive monitoring through equipment on August 5, 1998,
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The relevancy of the matter of applications of national military force, not expli-
citly authorized by the U.N., to secure compliance with the objectives of Security
Council resolution 6876 has been intensified in recent weeks as a result of sugges-
tions of the legality of such offered by Professor Ruth Wedgwood of the Yale Law
School and appearing in one of the world&apos;s leading periodicals on international
law.7 From the vantage of desiring a rational and ordered society based on the rule
of law, one should be extremely circumspect about suggesting the lawfulness of
the use of force, and hesitate offering any such suggestion in the absence of inex-
orable supporting evidence. As for public discussion of options that might resolve
the current inspection impasse and minimize the likelihood of a continuing on-
again-off-again UNSCOM inspection process, the general nature of the threat
posed by atomic, biological, and chemical weaponry is alone enough to suggest
unquestioned relevancy. Biological and chemical weapons have been employed by
Iraq in the past,8 and there is great concern they may in the future be the weapon
of choice of lesser developed nations and terrorist organizations.9
IL Use of Force to Secure Compliance With Security Council Resolution 687
One of the arguments advanced in support of the thesis that it is lawful to uni-
laterally use national military force&apos;to compel Iraqi observance of WMD obliga-
tions turns on the fact that Security Council resolution 687, which enunciates
those obligations, brought the Gulf War to an end through the mechanism of an
explicitly declared cease-fire. This is thought significant because that ended what
had essentially been a collaborative, yet nonetheless national, action undertaken in
a coordinated way by the United States, Great Britain, France and many others.
As the argument goes, since the Gulf War had not been prosecuted by U.N. stand-
ing forces acting under either article 43 of the Charter or the organization&apos;s com-
mand and control, it has been, and remains, up to the collaborating national states,
and not the U.N., to decide whether the termination of hostilities is to continue,
or military action of one form or another should be resumed.10
The central pillar of this argument has to do with the notion of the Gulf War as
a military action conducted essentially outside the context of the United Nations.
and then on October 31, 1998, refusing to cooperate in any way with UNSCOM inspectors. See
Barbara Crossette, Iraqs Sudden Rejection of Arms Scrutiny Brings U.S.Warning, N.Y. Times,
August 5, 1998, at A9, col. 1; Philip S h e n o n, U.S. Asserts It Will Consider Raids Unless Iraq Backs
Down, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2,1998, at A12, col. 5.
6 In principal part, those objectives include restoring and securing stability in the region, and
destroying Saddam Hussein&apos;s atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.
7 See Ruth Wedgwood, The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of
Force Against Iraqs Weapons of Mass Destruction, 92 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. 724 (1998).
8 See Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (1991); Human Rights
Watch, Iraq&apos;s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (1995).
9 See U.S.Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (1997), available at:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prollf97/secil.htmI (accessed Jan. 4, 1999).
10 See Wedgwood (note 7), at 725-727.
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There can be no doubt the action was not executed by standing U.N. armed
forces, and was not under the command and control of the U.N. itself.&quot; With
over 700,000 coalition troops under arms, 2000 military aircraft, and 100 warships,
it far and away exceeded any expedition the U.N. has ever mounted or attempted
to command.12 But just as undoubtedly, there is good reason to believe few would
regard the action as simply a coordinated military attack undertaken by coopera-
tive national forces acting independent of, and wholly divorced from, the United
Nations itself.13 Several pieces of -evidence are supportive of this line of reasoning.
To begin with, from the very day that Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Security Coun-
cil, and not just the individual members acting in consort, condemned the invasion
and demanded, in resolution 660, by a vote of 14 to 0, with Yemen abstaining, that
Iraq &quot;withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces.-14 By this action,
unequivocally stated as being taken under Charter articles 39 and 40, the Security
Council made plain it considered the organization itself seized of the matter. This
was followed four days later by the Council giving teeth to its withdrawal demand
through the imposition, under resolution 661, of a trade embargo.15 The effect of
this action was to supply member states with grounds for national measures of
trade restriction. Additionally, when it thereafter became apparent Iraq might be
circumventing the embargo, and discussion ensued regarding the possibility of
using military force to prevent such,16 authorization was sought from the
Security Council in the form of resolution 665, adopted 13 to 0, with Yemen and
Cuba abstaining. Immediate resort to unilateral military action was not had.17
Paragraph 1 of resolution 665, while acknowledging the then extant U.N. member
state cooperation with Kuwaiti efforts to deal with Iraq, makes clear that the use
of maritime forces may be necessary, but that such is to occur &quot;under the author-
ity of the Security Council ...&quot;.18 Further, the coalition forces that launched
Operation Desert Storm against Iraq on January 16, 1991, both sought and
obtained, in the form of Security Council resolution 678, U.N. imprimatur for
11 in fact, prior to the adoption of Security Council resolution 678 in November of 1990, there
was much wrangling among the various states about whether the military forces poised to strike Iraq
should be under U.N. command, or continue under national control. The U.S. argued for national
control and prevailed. See Abram C h a y e s, The Use of Force in the Persian Gulf, in: Law and Force
in the New International Order 3-4 (Damrosch &amp; Scheffer, eds. 1991).
12 See Barry E. C a r t e r /Phillip R. Tr i m b I e, International Law 1408 (2d ed. 1995).
13 For an interesting contrast, compare Eugene V. R o s t o w, Until What? Enforcement Action or
Collective Self-Defense?, 85 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. 506 (1991) (self-defense action) with Oscar Schachter,
United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, ibid., at 452 (overtones of enforcement action as well).
14 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990), para. 2, adopted Aug. 2, 1990.
15 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), adopted Aug. 6, 1990.
16 On the fact the U.S. took the position during these discussions that force could be used
without a new resolution from the Council authorizing such, see Chayes (note 11), 3 (suggesting
self-defense was the basis for the U.S.position). See also, Carter/Trimble (note 12), at 1402
(suggesting authority present in earlier adopted resolution 661).
17 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (1990), adopted Aug. 25, 1990.
18 See ibid. at para. 1.
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their efforts.19 They did not presume to act outside the United Nations. It cannot
be denied that paragra-ph 2 of that resolution speaks of &quot;authoriz[ing]&quot; the use of
all necessary means to remove Iraq.20 But such language can just as easily accom-
modate a reading that signifies affirmative empowerment as one that signifies
permission to exercise power already in existence. Paragraph 4 of resolution 678
seems to tilt in the direction of the first reading with its request that coalition
states &quot;keep the Council regularly informed on the progress of actions taken [to
secure compliance with previous resolutions on the Gulf crisis].&quot;21
As if not enough, there are other pieces of evidence suggesting the Gulf War
was far more than a purely coordinated military action by national armed forces.
Specifically, at the very time the coalition forces received authorization for launch-
ing their offensive, the U.S., by the far the main player, offered observations which
could be construed as indicating it viewed the effort as an inclusive, global cause
extending beyond the narrow interests of the collaborating national governments.
These observations came from both President George Bush and from Secretary
of State James Baker.22 Perhaps even more telling, however, is the background
connected with the April 1991 adoption of Security Council resolution 688, by a
19 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), para. 2, adopted Nov. 29, 1990, reprinted in: 29 Int&apos;l Legal
Mat. 1565 (1990) (Security Council &quot;[a]uthorizes Member States co-operating with the Government
of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) [requiring
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area&quot;).
20 Some have argued the feature of Security Council &quot;authorization&quot; signifies the self-defense
character of the Gulf War. See e.g., R o s t o w (note 13), at 508. This has apparently been picked up
by Professor Wedgwood as emphasizing the national, rather than U.N., aspects of the military
action brought to a halt by resolution 687. See We d gw o o d (note 7), at 726.
21 See Security Council resolution 678 (note 19), at para. 4. See also Jochen Abr. F r o w e i n, Uni-
lateral Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions - a Threat to Collective Security?, in: Liber
amicorum Gfinther Jaenicke - Zum 85. Geburtstag 97 at 102 (Volkmar G6tz/Peter Selmer/Riidiger
Wolfrum eds. 1998) (arguing in favor of a restrictive interpretation of resolution 678, preventing
suggestions that any claim to self-defense survived the resolution&apos;s adoption).
22 On November 29, 1990, the day the Security Council adopted resolution 678, Secretary Baker
indicated, in remarks before the Council, that the thrust of the resolution was to inform Iraq it could
&apos;choose peace by respecting the will of the international community,&quot; or suffer the consequences. See:
1 U.S. Dep&apos;t of State Dispatch (No. 14, Nov. 29, 1990) at 297 (1990). The following day, President
Bush echoed this view by observing the quarrel was not between the U.S. and Iraq, but &quot;Iraq and the
world,&quot; and that through adoption of 678 &quot;the Security Council has enhanced the legitimate peace-
keeping function of the United Nations.&quot; See ibid., at 295 (opening statement at White House news
conference). Two and one-half weeks later, in a statement at NATO Headquarters, Secretary Baker
declared in the same vein that he expected Iraq might undertake, before resolution 678s withdrawal
deadline, some action to undercut the &quot;collective will of the international community to use force.&quot;
See: 1 U.S. Dep&apos;t of State Dispatch (No. 17, Dec. 24, 1990) at 351 (1990) (Dec. 17, 1990, remarks at
NATO).
The international, U.N. aspects of the then impending military action also seem evident in a
response given by Secretary Baker, at a November 29, 1990, news conference, to a reporter&apos;s question
concerning the command and control of coalition military units. The question related to coordination
between coalition nations on a decision to commence Operation Desert Storm. It was asked if
the U.S. would act independently, and* in that context the questioner referenced the way in which
the Korean operation had been carried out in 1950. Secretary Baker was careful to emphasize the
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vote of 10 to 3, with two abstentions.23 This resolution was aimed at ending Iraq&apos;s
repression of its Kurdish population in the north, and Shiite population in the
south, repression that commenced when the damage inflicted by Operation Desert
Storm led to the surfacing of domestic hostility towards Baghdad.24 Interestingly
enough, had Britain, the U.S., and France, the major countries that provided
protection under the resolution, perceived the Gulf War cease-fire as bringing to
a halt a collaborative military campaign of a merely national character, they would
have felt little need to seek independent authority from the U.N. for what ulti-
mately became Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Southern Watch. True,
there had been debate about the &quot;domestic jurisdiction&quot; limitation in Charter
article 2, paragraph 7.25 But the fact that affirmative authority was sought in or-
der to justify intervention in territory where recently halted military action had
contributed to the domestic situation suggests recognition that the military action
itself had been conducted under the umbrella of the United Nations, despite
retention of formal control by national military authorities.
A second argument advanced to support the thesis that it is lawful to employ
national military force unilaterally to compel Iraqi observance of WMD obliga-
tions under Security Council resolution 687, concerns the coalition state air strikes
against Iraq on January 13, 1993.26 Of particular significance is the fact that these
strikes were taken without advance approval or specific authorization by the
United Nations Security Council. The strikes were designed to respond to a Jan-
uary 7, 1993, decision by Iraq to prevent UNSCOM from using the Habbaniyah
airfield for short-notice weapons inspections.27 Surely, so the argument goes, if
non-U.N. authorized military force of a national character has been employed by
former coalition states in the past to enforce Iraqi inspection obligations, then its
use would seem equally as acceptable now or in the future.
collective and cooperative nature of future action. Though he did not pick up on the reference to the
U.N. action in Korea, one reading of his response is that future action was not envisioned as being
purely national in character. See: I U.S. Dept of State Dispatch (No. 14, Dec. 3, 1990) at 299, 300- 01
(1990).
23 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), adopted Apr. 5, 1991, reprinted in: 30 Int&apos;l Legal Mat. 858
(1991). Beyond the fact that Security Council resolution 688 evidences the continuing nature of the
U.N.&apos;s involvement in decisions about how the fall-out from the Gulf War is to be handled, and a
refusal to allow member states unilaterally to arrogate to themselves all decisional authority, see
F r o we i n (note 2 1), at 106, for the view that that resolution cannot be interpreted as authorizing the
use of force against Iraq.
24 On the repressions, see Howard Adelman, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the
Kurds, 4 Int&apos;l J. Refugee L. 4 (1992); Middle East Watch, The Anfal Campaign in Iraqi Kurdistan: The
Destruction of Koreme (1993).
25 Jane E. S t r o m s e t h, Iraqs Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and
Continuing Challenges, in: Enforcing Restraint 83-90 (Lori Damrosch ed., 1993).
26 See We d gwo o d (note 7), at 727-28.
27 See: Statement by the President of the Security Council Concerning United Nations Flights
into Iraqi Territory, U.N. Doc. S/25081 (1993) (condemnation of the Iraqi action as a &quot;material
breach&quot; of obligations under resolution 687). See also: Note by the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/25091 (1993).
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Obviously, what is especially troubling for such a contention are the circum-
stances surrounding Secretary-General Kofi Annan&apos;s February 23, 1998, memo-
randum of understanding (MOU) with Iraq on UNSCOM inspections of presi-
dential palaces,2,8 and its implementing Security Council resolution, 1154.29 Two
reasons exist for this view. First, it must be remembered that, when Iraq in late
Fall, early Winter 1997 balked at permitting UNSCOM to inspect presidential
palaces, the response of the international community was ultimately diplomatic
rather than military.30 There was no rush to use military force such as might have
been expected had the January 1993 air strikes left no doubt about what the law
permitted.31 Second, the language chosen by the Security Council in resolution
1154 to implement the Secretary-General&apos;s MOU steered well away from author-
izing individual states to resort unilaterally to the use of force in the event of an
Iraqi breach of that new commitment.32 While the Council opted for the ambig-
uous language of &quot;severest consequences,&quot; language plainly able to accommodate
the possibility of force, the formulation seems peculiar if past practice really
evidenced the permissibility of unilateral, national determinations to take military
action.33 When to all of this is added the fact that resolution 678&apos;s basic Gulf War
&quot;authoriz[ation]&quot; concerning the use of force speaks, in paragraph 2, only of uses
to &quot;implement Security Council Resolution 660 and subsequent relevant
Resolutions, &quot;34 it would seem difficult to adjudge any past or future unilateral use
of national force lawful. This is because each of the resolutions mentioned in
paragraph 2 addresses, in one form or another, Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,
not WMD inspections, a matter that only arose following the conclusion of the
Gulf War.
Apart from the circumstances associated with the Secretary-General&apos;s MOU,
resolution 1154, and paragraph 2 of resolution 678, there are several other reasons
for hesitancy about accepting the January 1993 attack on Iraq as demonstrating
the lawfulness of non-U.N. authorized national uses of military force to compel
28 Reprinted in: How Accord Will Work: Special Group is Set Up, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1998, at
A8, col. 5.
29 See U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 154, adopted 2 March 1998, available at: http://wwwun.org/plweb-cgi/
since.cgi?dbname=scres&amp;foryear=1998 (accessed March 12, 1998).
30 It must be acknowledged that, in spite of the eventual diplomatic solution, international politi-
cal tensions were on a razors edge. The U.S., in particular, had undertaken a large scale military build
up in the region and was thought to be preparing for a strike against targets in Iraq.
31 To some extent, it must be acknowledged that the deterioration of relations between Security
Council peers occurring from 1991 to 1997-98 may have played a role here.
32 Certainly there were Security Council members who supported language that would have
authorized force to be used in the event of a breach. Nonetheless, their proposals were incapable of
securing approval of the Council. On the debates in the Council, see: U.N. Press Release
SC/6483, 3858th mtg., 2 March 1998, available at: http://wwwun.org/plweb-cgi/idoc.pl?215
+unix+
-free-+wwwun.org..80+un+un+prl 998+prl 998++ %26 (accessed Mar. 17, 1998).
33 See Security Council resolution 1154 (note 29), at para. 3. See Frowein (note 21), at 110
(indicating &quot;severest consequences&quot; can include military force, but concluding that resolution 1154
requires further Security Council authorization before resort can be had to that option).
34 See Security Council resolution 678 (note 19), at para. 2.
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Baghdad to comply with its WMD inspection obligations. For openers, the cir-
cumstances. surrounding the January 1993 attack indicate that Iraqi incursions into
Kuwait to retrieve weaponry left behind on withdrawal, and deployment of Iraqi
antiaircraft missiles in and near no-fly zones, served as more of a provocation than
actions connected with UNSCOM short-notice inspection activities.35 Given this,
it would seem difficult to draw from the mere fact of the attack the inference that
it occurred in response to, and set a precedent for, breaches of Iraqs inspection
commitments. Additionally, Security Council resolution 678, the resolution which
authorized coalition states to use force in the first place, and resolution 687, which
ended the Gulf War and established Iraqs WMD obligations, as well as a series of
other U.N. instruments, including resolution 715, the presidential palaces MOU,
and resolution 1154, all indicate the Security Council views itself as seized of the
Iraq matter under Chapter VII of the Charter.36 Given the Council&apos;s authority
under Chapter VII regarding the use of force, it would seem somewhat of a stretch
to ignore the Council&apos;s repeated expressions and accept unilateral, national deci-
sions free of U.N. control. As one distinguished, senior international law scholar
stated on a related point concerning the use of force against Iraq: &quot;[even to] char-
acterize the [Gulf War] military action as collective self-defense rather than as a
United Nations action does not imply that the use of force was [or is] wholly a
matter of discretion for the cooperating states; ...-.37 Further, there are the reac-
tions by the members of the Security Council to the recent British-U.S. attack of
December 16-19, 1998. The reactions involved a combination of muted approval
and clear criticism for the use of military force.38 The implication is that of a real
reluctance on the Council&apos;s part to see any past national military attack on Iraq as
indicative of some ongoing permission to use force to compel that nation to meet
its WMD obligations.
The objective in recounting each of the preceding reasons for questioning
whether the Gulf War cease-fire and the January 13, 1993, air strikes on Iraq sup-
port the application of national military force to secure observance of that nation&apos;s
WMD obligations, has not been to suggest some fundamental opposition to the
35 See Michael R. G o r d o n, Bush Said to Plan Air Strike on Iraq Over Its Actions, N.Y Times,
Jan. 13, 1993, at Al, col. 5 (listing a variety of provocations). It should also be noted that, unlike the
Gulf War itself, several nations, including China, were less than enthusiastic supporters, thus reflect-
ing on the clarity of the strikes as permissible under international law. See: (Op-Ed) just Punishment
for Iraqs Offenses, N.Y. Times, Jan 14, 1993, at A24, col. 1 (China not supportive); Youssef M. I b -
r a h i in, Many Arabs See &apos;Double Standard&apos;..., N.Y Times, Jan. 15, 1993, at A8, col. 4 (several Gulf
states critical).
36 On resolution 678, see (note 19) at third paragraph of the preamble; on resolution 687, see (note
3) at para. 34; on resolution 715, see U.N. Doc. S/RES/715, adopted 11 Oct. 1991, available at:
http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres07l5.htm (accessed Jan. 10, 1999); on the MOU, see (note
28) at para. 1; on resolution 1154, see (note 29) at para. 5.
37 See S c h a c h t e r (note 13), at 460 (emphasis added).
38 See: International Reaction: Critics From Paris to Kuwait, but a Friend in London, N.Y. Times,
at Dec. 18, 1998, at A21, col. 1; Barbara Crossette, At the U.N., Alliances of Cold War Are
Renewed, ibid., at Al 9, col. 6; Michael R. G o r d o n, Moscow Orders U.S. Envoy Home to Protest
Air Strikes, ibid., at A21, col. 5.
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military option. It is beyond dispute that instances occasionally arise which leave
little choice. The WMD situation with Iraq might well be just such a case. None-
theless, in light of the fact armed force is perhaps the single greatest power in the
possession of the various members of the world community, resort to it should
never be e xp I a i n e d as based on prevailing legal rules unless it is absolutely clear
those rules provide complete justification. It is the prohibition on the use of force,
not the permissions concerning such, that the U.N. Charter articulates in its open-
ing provisions. Self-defense, individual or collective, as well as U.N. applied or
authorized military force, are all tucked back in Chapter VIL seemingly creating
a presumption of sorts. In the event the use of military force is felt essential in a
situation where the law suggests impermissibility, the preference should be for an
explanation grounded in the non-legal. Arguments of lawfulness are likely to be
perceived as disingenuous dissembling, undermining the sanctity of law needed
for increasing its role in affecting the actual conduct of states.
III. An Undiscussed Option for Future WMD Inspections in Iraq
The issue of non-U.N. authorized nationally applied military force to secure
observance by Iraq of its WMD inspection obligations is an extremely important
one. However, from the standpoint of a peaceful resolution of the very matter that
generates that issue, finding an option capable of both restarting the inspection
process and keeping it moving forward is far more important. Such would serve
two clear purposes. First, it would insure that there would be only a minimal
chance of military force being used against Iraq, thus saving untold suffering and
precious tax dollars, and perhaps accelerating Iraq&apos;s reintegration into the commu-
nity of nations. And second, it would contribute to resumption and maintenance
of a regime aimed at regulating Iraqi activity in the field of WMD, an area
currently of great concern to defense analysts.
In the immediate aftermath of the December 16-19, 1998, British and
U.S.cruise missile attacks and air strikes against military targets in Iraq, the level
of public discussion by key national policymakers and United Nations officials
and representatives about Baghdad&apos;s reticence regarding WMD inspections has
accelerated substantially. To a certain extent, this acceleration reflects the growing
splits within the Security Council that have gradually surfaced since the Gulf
War.39 It is also evidence of increasing frustration on the part of the Council, frus-
tration born of eight long, arduous years filled with constant Iraqi footdragging
and prevarication. Additionally, the acceleration may represent a testimonial to
the skill and adroitness of Saddam Hussein in playing one state against another,
tweaking the U.S. and UNSCOM at what he considers precisely the right
moment. Irrespective of the factors that have contributed to the acceleration in
39 See text accompanying note 31. The splits, at least in part, are the result of the inclination of
states like ]France, Russia, and China to be autonomous in the matters of international relations. In
the case of Russia, national political pressures may also play a contributory role.
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public discussion about what to do on Iraq and its WMD inspections, a variety
of proposals have been voiced. Perhaps the one subject to the greatest attention
has been the suggestion that Saddam Hussein be removed from power.40 While
removal may result in a government committed to fulfilling its inspection obliga-
tions and restoring friendly relations with its neighbors, it might also produce a
civil war, resulting in Iraq being totally or partially dismembered, thereby contrib-
uting to further friction and instability in the region.41 However, on the assump-
tion that Iraq&apos;s political leadership will remain unchanged, other options affecting
the WMD inspection process have also been put forward. Two of these options in
particular, the French option and the U.S. option, warrant brief description.
The French option was circulated to the members of the Security Council
within four weeks of the commencement of the December 1998 British and
U.S. air strikeS.42 It attempts to deal with the twin issues of economic sanctions
and weapons inspections by proposing a phased lifting of sanctions, beginning
first with oil, removing sanctions on other items in accordance with Iraqi cooper-
ation on future weapons inspections.43 The proposal put forward by France
would also replace UNSCOM with a &quot;renewed control commission&quot; responsible
for monitoring prohibited Iraqi WMD activities, rather than for conducting intru-
sive inspections designed to get a handle on Iraqs past weapons programs.44
Another important feature of the French option would be the substitution of a
financial surveillance system for the existing oil-for-food escrow account. The idea
would be to insure Iraq avoided utilizing its oil revenues for objectionable
weapons activities, but this would be accomplished without requiring advance
U.N. permission for disbursements from an earmarked account.45
The U.S. option was offered immediately on the heels of the proposal coming
from Paris. It differs radically from the French option in that it suggests little
beyond removing the current cap of $5.2 billion every six months on the amount
of revenues Iraq is permitted to generate by export sales of oil.46 The U.S. pro-
posal would leave UNSCOM in place, and also the rules that body administers.47
Moreover, it would continue to insist upon full compliance by Iraq with its WMD
inspection obligations prior to any lifting of the economic embargo against that
40 See: (Editorial) Unseating Saddam Hussein, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1998, at A30. Col. 1; James
R i s e n, U.S. Calling for New Iraq Government, But Has No Plan to Oust Current One, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 23, 1998, available at: http://wwwnytimes.com/library/world/mideast/122398iraq-opposi-
tion.html (accessed Dec. 23, 1998).
41 See Tom Rau m, U.S.-Iraq Policy Criticized by General, Tulsa World, Jan. 29, 1999, at A5,
Col. 2 (Marine General Anthony Zinni fears efforts to overthrow Saddam Hussein will result in
instability).
42 See Barbara C r o s s e t t e, France, in Break With U.S., Urges End to Iraq Embargo, N.Y Times,
Jan. 14, 1999, at A6, Col. 3.
43 See ibid.
44 See ibid.
45 See ibid.
46 See Jane P e r I e z, U.S. Proposes Easing U.N. Curbs on Iraq Oil, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1999, As,
Col. 1.
47 See ibid.
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country.
48 At the same time, the proposal retains* the existing escrow account
approach to assuring that revenues generated by permitted Iraqi oil exports are
not diverted from food, medicine, and humanitarian purchases, and the payment
of Gulf War compensation claims.49 In that regard, it is interesting to note that
recent reports indicate the poor condition of Iraqs oil production facilities have
effectively limited sales to around $3.5 billion every six monthS.50 Given this, it
seems questionable that, in the absence of modifications of some other sort, the
mere removal of the oil revenues cap is likely to induce renewed and continued
cooperation by Baghdad with U.N. weapons inspectors.
Indications suggest that it is Iraqs chemical weapons file that remains the prin-
cipal WMD file of concern.51 This suggestion derives from a number of factors,
with two being particularly prominent: evidence from June 1998 that the deadly
nerve agent VX had been loaded on the warheads of Iraqi projectileS;52 and
discovery by inspectors, in July of that same year, of a document suggesting Iraq,
in its earlier declarations to the U.N., vastly underestimated the number of weap-
ons armed with chemical devices during its Eight Year War (1980 - 88) with Iran.53
Together, these two factors can be seen as representing a continuing effort by Iraq
to refuse to provide full and complete disclosure on its chemical weapons
programs.54
It cannot be said with certainty what really viable options exist for restarting the
WMD inspections process and keeping it moving forward. Only time will tell
whether the French or the U.S. proposals actually fall into that category. Apart
from those two, there is one option in particular that specifically addresses Iraq&apos;s
chemical weapons file, and has escaped any noticeable degree of public discussion
by officials of interested nation-states. Prior to turning attention to that option,
there is another option that bears at least brief mention. Specifically, that other
option would involve conditionally lifting the entire U.N. imposed trade embargo
for a limited time, say 90 days, with extensions dependent upon the resumption of
complete, unconditional cooperation by Iraq within a time certain. The broad
48 See ibid.
49 See ibid.
50 See ibid.
51 See Barbara Crossette and Steven Erlanger, Allies See Bombing of Iraq as Inevitable:
Hussein Likely to Break Vow, U.S. Says, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1998, at Al, col. 6, at A8, col. 1 (Chief
UNSCOM inspector sees fewer problems on ballistic missiles than on chemical weapons, with not
enough known on biological weapons activities).
52 See Christopher S.Wren, Iraq Insists It&apos;s Being Candid with U.N. Arms Inspectors, N.Y.
Times, June 23, 1998, at A6, col. 5; Christopher S.Wren, Lab Reports of Iraq Poison Bolster Case
for Sanctions, N.Y Times, June 24, 1998, at A9, col. 1; Christopher S. Wr e n, U.N. Arms Inspector
Firm on Iraq Nerve Gas but Accepts New Tests, N.Y Times, June 25, 1998, at A10, col. 1.
53 See Barbara C r o s s e t t e, Iraq Backtracks In New Defiance Over Inspections, N.Y Times,
Nov. 23, 1998, at Al, col. 6, at A10, col. 2; UNSCOM Chairman Butler&apos;s Report to UN Secretary-
General, 15 Dec. 1998, available at: http://wvv-wfas.org/news/un/iraq/s/butla2l6.htm (accessed Jan.
27, 1999).
54 For the official report on the VX matter, see: Report of the Group of International Experts on
VX, U.N. Doc. S/1998/995, Annex, 26 Oct. 1998.
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scope of any such move may be sufficiently attractive that Iraq might be interested
in accepting the option, while viewing the more limited French proposal as
unappealing. Of course, one of the major hurdles presented by this option, a
hurdle not inherent in France&apos;s proposal, is the fact Iraq would be expected to
allow UNSCOM itself to renew its inspection activities.55 That has been an espe-
cially sensitive matter for Baghdad. In various public fora it has painted the U.N.
Special Commission as biased and partial. On the positive side, however, to the
extent the British and the U.S. remain insistent the present inspection regime be
left intaCt,56 a conditional lifting of the entire trade embargo may restart an inspec-
tion process that will produce a thorough investigation of Iraq&apos;s WMD programs.
Attention is now turned to the option alluded to in the preceding paragraph as
specifically addressing Iraq&apos;s chemical weapons file. This option differs radically
from anything yet proposed to date and, again, has not been the subject of any real
public discussion. The primary feature of the option would be to shift responsibil-
ity on the chemical weapons front to The Hague based Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), established to oversee compliance
with the obligations of the newly effective Chemical Weapons Convention of
1993.57 The attraction of the OPCW option is that it walks a middle path
between, on the one hand, completely lifting the embargo or eliminating the
UNSCOM inspection regime and, on the other, insisting that the embargo remain
and Iraq continue to show the requisite obeisance to UNSCOM and its weapons
inspectors. The proposal put forward by France also vests some entity other than
the U.N. Special Commission with responsibility for assuring that Iraq does
not mount a WMD redevelopment effort. Clearly, given Iraq&apos;s perception of
UNSCOM as prejudiced, this attribute provides either option with a certain
appeal.
Distinct from the French proposal, however, the OPCW option would leave
intrusive inspections in place, thereby appealing as well to those concerned about
Iraq having to come clean on its chemical weapons activities. Such inspections
could result from having the Organization continue to apply the extant UN-
SCOM inspection rules to Iraq, or simply having the familiar terms of the CWC
55 Attention should also be drawn to the fact the Arab League has recently indicated its support
for maintenance of the economic embargo until Iraq fully complies with its WMD obligations, while
criticizing the British-U.S. air strikes of December 16 -19. See Douglas J e h 1, As Arab League Urges
Iraqis to Obey the U.N., They Walk Out of the Meeting, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1999, at A10, col. 1.
56 On the fact Britain may be prepared to back away from the present UNSCOM regime, see
Barbara C r o s s e t t e, U.S. More Isolated In U.N. on Keeping the Iraq Sanctions, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 12, 1999, at Al, col. 5, at A8, col. 1.
57 See: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, done at Paris, 13 Jan. 1993, reprinted in: 32 Int&apos;l Legal
Mat. 800 (1993). For a review of the Convention&apos;s history, see Walter Krutzsch/Ralf Trapp, A
Commentary on the Chemical Weapons Convention (1994). On the export control aspects of the
Convention, see Rex J. Zedalis, New Export Controls for Chemicals on the Horizon?, 30 Intl
Lawyer 141 (1996); Rex J. Zedalis, The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act-
United States Control Over Exports, 90 Am. J. Int&apos;l L. 138 (1996) (reviewing an earlier proposed
version of the U.S. domestic implementing legislation).
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applied instead. As with the UNSCOM rules, those provided in the CWC would
require Iraq to subject its past chemical weapons activities, including activities
connected with potential weapons precursor chemicals, to declaration and on-site
verification inspections.58 Relative to inspections, though, there are numerous
differences between the two sets of rules that must be considered in the context
of any decision about which should be applied to Iraq. For example, the CWC
provides for &quot;routine&quot; and &quot;challenge&quot; inspections.59 In many cases, routine
inspections require forty-eight hour advance notice,60 and even challenge inspec-
61tions at least twelve hours, with the possibility of challenge inspectors not being
transported by the nation to be inspected to the specific site any earlier than
twenty-four hours after arrival at the so-called point of entry.62 UNSCOM rules
permit unannounced, surprise inspections.63 Another example is that a CWC
challenge inspection may only seek facts related to the particular limited and
identified concern that caused a certain CWC state-party to exercise its authority
to request that the CIPCW carry out the inspection.64 UNSCOM has not been so
shackled.65 Clearly, such differences are important. Nonetheless, the full signifi-
cance of the differences has to be considered against the background of the CWC
inspection regime being thought of as sufficient to prevent many nations much
more powerful and scientifically sophisticated than Iraq from constituting a chem-
ical weapons arsenal.
In the event a shift to the OPCW is deemed of interest, there can be no doubt
that it has support in the documents that created the existing UNSCOM inspection
regime. Paragraph 25 of S/22614,66 the Security Council&apos;s plan for the information
gathering and weapons destruction phases of the Iraqi WMD regime, envisions
the establishment of an ongoing monitoring and verification phase.67 With reference
58 See: Chemical Weapons Convention, arts. I-V, ibid. at 804-09, and especially art. III(l)(c), ibid.
at 806, indicating that required declarations concerning production facilities cover any facility that
&quot;has had&quot; chemical
weapons production. Given that art. II(1), ibid. at 804, contains an extremely
broad definition of chemical weapons, a wide range of production facilities will be involved.
59 See Barry K e I I in a n, David S. G u a I t i e r i and Edward A. Ta n z in a n, Disarmament and Dis-
closure: How Arms Control Verification Can Proceed Without Threatening Confidential Business
Information, 36 Harv. Int&apos;l LJ. 71 at 87 (1995).
60 See CWC (note 57), at 824, 859, Verification Annex, Pt. VII (30).
61 See ibid. at 817, art. IX(15).
62 See ibid. at 865, Verification Annex, Pt. X(14).
63 See: Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq&apos;s Compliance with Relevant
Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22871/Rev.1, 2 October
1991 at 5, paras. 17(c) and 18(c).
64 See (note 60), Pt. X(44)-(45).
65 See (note 63), at 13, Annex I, para. 2(e), and at 14, para. 5.
66 See: Plan for the Implementation of Relevant Parts of Section C of Security Council Resolution
687 (1991) at 6, para. 25, U.N. Doc. S/22614, 17 May 1991.
67 The details of that phase are further spelled out in two other Security Council documents:
S/22871/Rev.1 (note 63); and Plan for Future Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraqs Compli-
ance with Paragraph 12 of Part of Section C of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and with the
Requirements of Paragraphs 3 and 5 of Resolution 707 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22872/Rev. 1, 20 Septem-
ber 1991.
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to such, the fourth sentence of the paragraph mentions what was at that time the
proposed Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The immediately
following sentence then provides that &quot;[w]ith the eventual entry into force of such
a Convention, the inspectorate envisaged in it should at an appropriate time
take over the function of monitoring and verification of compliance in the area of
chemical weapons.1168 Arguably, the Security Council was thinking about a time
following the completion of the tasks of the U.N. Special Commission. But even if
one were to view the on-again-off-again nature of the inspections in Iraq over the
past couple of years as suggesting the time is now &quot;appropriate&quot; for turning in the
OPCW&apos;s direction, two matters would still remain.
The first would involve the fact that, since Iraq is not a party to the CWC, any
shift to the OPCW that looks toward that body applying the rules of the CWC
would require some device for legally obligating Baghdad to adhere to prescrip-
tions and duties therein spelled out. Presumably, such a device would not prove
troublesome. After all, if Iraq found it attractive to move the responsibility for the
chemical weapons file out of UNSCOM, it could accept the condition precedent
that it become a state-party to the CWC, or at least commit to the application of
the Convention&apos;s rules. The second matter would involve the whole issue of
supervision of Iraq&apos;s files on biological weapons and ballistic missile systems. The
OPCW is charged with supervising chemical weapons. And while there may be a
certain degree of overlap with biological weapons, there would unquestionably be
resistance to having such placed under the authority of the new Hague-based
Organization. However, international negotiations are now underway to create
verification mechanisms for the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and once
concluded might provide a device comparable to the OpCW.69 As for ballistic
missile systems, satellite surveillance is currently capable of detecting tests viola-
tive of prohibitions aimed at preventing development of a missile capability. Thus,
removing UNSCOM from the mix should not prove especially problematic in
stemming further Iraqi work on such systems.
IV Conclusion
Hopefully, the international community will be able to work its way through
the WMD problem with Iraq. In retrospect, though, there can be little question
that this has been an immensely complicated and draining experience. Nonethe-
less, we should keep in the bright forefront of our minds that we have it within
our power to shape the future destiny of our world. The choices we make regard-
ing how international law is to be understood and applied in this and other com-
68 See note 66.
69 See: (Associated Press), Germ Warfare Treaty Advances, Tulsa World, Jan. 23, 1999, at AS, col.
I (present Treaty commits states-parties not to develop or stockpile bioweapons, and negotiations
seek to establish an inspection regime).
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parably difficult situationS,70 and the time and attention we accord to making
every effort to explore all available avenues for solving intractable problems, will
determine whether future generations are able to marvel at the patience and disci-
pline that made them inheritors of a more ordered society, or remark with regret
at how unfortunate it was that we missed important opportunities.
Since the collapse of the Iron Curtain, we have been the beneficiaries of many
&apos;hances, not perhaps to cure, but certainly to palliate, some of the insidious socialc
and political maladies that afflict relations between the members of the interna-
tional community. Time is running out. Every day we face immense pressures to
return to the old ways, or replace ideologies that truly have been discarded with
new progenitors of suspicion and division. Unless each and every nation-state, up
and down the board, commits now to making a genuine and indefatigable effort
at speaking frankly about the law, and seeking novel ways to solve old problems,
we may assure that generations to come will labor under the exact same compul-
sions that have shadowed humanity since the dawn of time. Fear, frustration, and
force will be the only rule that really prevails. Understanding, compassion, and
justice will remain as elusive as they are today.
70 See F r o w e i n (note 2 1), at 97-112 (arguing that the Security Council resolutions dealing with
the Iraqi situation seem not to permit unilateral use of military force, and, because of the sanctity
of state sovereignty and the Council&apos;s retention of oversight on the matter, should be construed as
requiring specific U.N. authorization prior to the employment of such).
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